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During the past years, there has been an exponential growth of internet connected devices all 
over the world. In future the growth of these devices is expected to grow at the higher rate. There 
are some studies estimating that Internet of Things (IoT) will be able to connects 500 billion 
devices by 2030. IoT smart devices are remotely accessible and are possible to control using 
existing network infrastructure. 
At present, the usage of Internet of Things has increased rapidly. IoT is a dynamic global network 
between smart objects or things connected over the internet. IoT wireless network can connect 
anyone with anything at any place. With the rapid growth of IoT, security threats and vulnerabilities 
of the linked objects are also increasing continuously. Now, IoT security has become the most 
paramount technological research work over the world. The main objective of all IoT applications 
is to maintaining privacy and secure data transmission between devices. Due to the 
heterogeneous characteristics and constrained devices it is challenging to deploy security 
mechanisms in IoT compare to traditional network. 
In this thesis, we highlight the importance of security in the IoT sector by studying a wide range 
of IoT security issues. Furthermore, we described several challenges derived from the existing 
IoT protocols and the security features of IoT protocols are also explained. In addition, 
implementation of UDP communication protocol and MQTT protocol using Contiki OS and Zolertia 
RE-Mote devices are added to the work. Cryptographic methods AES [1] and ECC [2] are 
described in the thesis and the implementation of AES-128 to secure device communication and 
ECC key generation process are also added to the thesis work. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
     At present, communication technology is no longer limited to person-to-person communication 
but can also connect people with a wide range of devices all over the world. In near future, it is 
expected that everything and everyone in our society will be connected. Internet of Things (IoT) 
was introduced to fulfill this present technology demands. The term IoT was invented by Kevin 
Ashton in 1999 [3]. Even though the concept exists for almost 20 years there is still no unique 
definition about the field. Internet of Things allows people to connect with devices, sensors, 
services using a wired or wireless network from anywhere to achieve a specific goal. ‘Thing’ is 
used as a physical or virtual object that can communicate with other objects or users in IoT. 
Different organizations and group of researchers elucidated IoT definition in their own way. 
Stephan Haller et al. [4] defined IoT as “A world where physical objects are seamlessly integrated 
into the information network, and where the physical objects can become active participants in 
business processes. Services are available to interact with these ‘smart objects’ over the Internet, 
query their state and any information associated with them, considering security and privacy 
issues”. According to Gartner [5], “The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical objects 
that contain embedded technology to communicate and sense [6] or interact with their internal 
states or the external environment”. IoT smart devices are remotely accessible and are possible 
to control using existing network infrastructure. To manage the efficient and secure connectivity 
between devices and objects over the internet, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [7] 
designed a lightweight IPv6 network routing protocol for IoT [8]. According to Cisco [5], IoT will be 
able to connect 500 billion devices to the internet by 2030.  
     Along with the exponential increase in the number of IoT usage, security threats and effects 
on privacy has grown severely in communication. Secure data transmission and maintaining 
privacy and trust are the primary motive for all IoT applications. Due to the heterogeneous 
characteristics of the Internet of Things, privacy protection is a great challenge for any IoT 
applications [3]. IoT is mostly using constrained devices with low processing power, limited 
memory, battery supported compared to traditional internet. Therefore, it is difficult to extend 
security functionalities on these light IoT devices. 
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Figure 1: IoT Architecture [9] 
 
1.2 Thesis Objectives 
     The purpose of this thesis is to describe the importance of IoT security, security protocols that 
are introduced for implementing in different IoT layers and the security challenges in IoT. Chapter 
3 will cover all these mentioned contexts. In case of transferring sensitive data over the Internet 
using IoT, security and privacy are important topics to focus on by the organizations or businesses 
before implementing IoT network [10]. Since all IoT devices will be connected over the Internet, it 
is important to have security schemes that will protect the devices from malicious attack and to 
keep transmitted data immune. Applying security could be the biggest challenge for compatible 
speed and performance.  Nowadays, enormous research work is going on to evolve challenges 
associated with the security and privacy issues in IoT. Finally, the implementation of some 
example programs in Zolertia Re-Mote hardware devices will be added to this thesis work to 
evaluate the performance of Zolertia IoT constrained devices at Chapter 4. 
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1.3 Author’s Contribution 
     In this thesis, the Author’s contribution are as follows: 
• Presenting the importance of IoT security and the challenges which make it difficult to 
implement the security scheme in the IoT devices as well as in the IoT networks. 
• Describing the IoT protocols and the security features of these protocols that are now 
popular to the developers. 
• Implementing an experimental study based on Zolertia RE-Mote devices (see Chapter 4). 
• Implementation of UDP (User Datagram Protocol) and MQTT (Message Queuing 
Telemetry Transport) protocols and secure communication between devices using AES-
128 encryption method. 
• Drawing conclusions on the theoretical and experimental studies and discussing the 
possible future directions in the addressed research field. 
  
1.4 Limitations 
     This thesis is focused on the theoretical description of IoT protocols and the security features 
of all those protocols that have been proposed as mean to protect IoT from several security and 
privacy threats. In addition, some security protocols and cryptographic algorithms are described 
in Chapter 3. Apart from the theoretical work, we also conducted some experiments that help us 
to test the applicability of popular cryptographic functions on IoT devices with constraint 
resources. Our testbed conformed from a number of interconnected Re-Mote Zolertia devices 
running on Contiki OS [14] - an operating system that has been built to fit squarely the specific 
needs of IoT. Implementation of MQTT communication protocol will be tested using Contiki OS, 
but other protocols like COAP, DTLS, and other operating systems will not be covered. Zolertia 
Re-Mote devices are used as hardware platforms for the testing and implementation part in 
Chapter 4, because of the availability and for some attractive features like the communication 
range between 100 meters and 20 km, ARM Cortex-M3 32 MHz clock speed. Contiki OS supports 
the software that is developed for Zolertia hardware. A digital Grove light sensor is used to obtain 
real data for the testing purpose. A brief description of Zolertia hardware and the utilized sensors 
will be presented in Chapter 4. 
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1.5 Organization 
      Chapter 2 presents the background knowledge about the technologies and protocols that are 
being used for both hardware and software implementation in this thesis writing.  
     Chapter 3 describes a list of security issues and challenges for IoT. Furthermore, some 
security protocols that are designed for different IoT layers are described. More precisely, a brief 
description of MQTT [11], DTLS [12], COAP [13] protocols are provided to analyze security issues 
for constrained Node Networks. 
     Chapter 4 illustrates the concepts of hardware devices and tools that are used for the 
experiments to get the desired results. All the test procedures are included in this chapter. 
     Finally, in Chapter 5 we conclude this study by highlighting the main points as well as some 
possible future directions.  
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2.  IoT OVERVIEW  
In this chapter, we present the main technologies that will be used in this thesis work. A variety of 
protocols and communication technologies are used for the IoT. A brief description of IoT 
technologies, protocols and operating system are presented below for making it easier to 
understand the use of each technology and protocols. Further details will be added to other 
chapters based on the thesis work. 
 
 2.1 IEEE 802.15.4 
       IEEE 802.15.4 [14] is a broadly used mesh network communication standard, the first version 
was released in 2003. This standard is intended to use in low-data-rate and low-cost 
communications between inexpensive devices to achieve the lowest power consumption. At 
present, various network layer protocols such as 6LoWPAN, ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.5 run over 
IEEE 802.15.4 based networks. 
 
       This standard provides physical layer, medium access control sublayer (MAC) of the OSI 
model specifications for low-data-rate wireless connectivity with portable or fixed devices with 
limited battery consumption requirements. As a MAC mechanism this standard uses a CSMA / 
CA protocol. These characteristics make IEEE 802.15.4 contrasted from Wi-Fi technology, which 
requires more power and offers large bandwidth. It describes the smaller range of wireless 
communication compared to Wi-Fi. It supports 10-meter communication range with a transfer rate 
of 250 Kbit/s.  
 
       IEEE 802.15.4 standard supports network topologies such as star and peer-to-peer and two 
types of network nodes: Full Function Device (FFD) and Reduced Function Device (RFD). FFD 
can operate all operations and can communicate to all other devices for sending and receiving 
data in the network. RFD is simpler and can only communicate with FFD nodes in the network. It 
uses 64-bit or short 16-bit IEEE addressing modes for each node. Devices that support IEEE 
802.15.4 can use one of 868/915/2450 MHz frequency bands for operations.  
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2.2 Bluetooth Low Energy 
       Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [15] is a wireless communication technology designed for short-
range communication, developed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG). BLE succeed in 
the market as Bluetooth 4.0 by 2011. It is quite different than classic Bluetooth. The primary 
difference is in power consumption. BLE is used only for the applications that are applicable to 
transferring the short amount of data and therefore it can run over a small battery for several 
years. But it is not ideal for phone calls [15].  
 
        The key features of BLE are low cost, low power consumption, enhanced range, multi-vendor 
interoperability. Classic Bluetooth and BLE both operate in the same spectrum range 2.4 GHz 
ISM band, but they use different channels. Bluetooth Low Energy has the data transfer rate up to 
1 Mbit/s and the possible range is over 100 m. It supports full AES-128 encryption to provide 
encryption and authentication of data packets. BLE technology is now being used by numerous 
numbers of applications like security, low power sensor devices, entertainment, healthcare [16] 
[17] [18] [19], automotive industries to provide a wireless connection between manufacturers and 
consumers [20]. 
 
2.3 WSN  
      Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) [21] can be generally defined as a network that may control 
and sense surrounded environment as well as establishes device-gateway communication where 
devices are acting as network nodes and border routers are performing as gateway. In WSN, data 
is forwarded to multiple nodes and data forwarded to other networks using a gateway. Wireless 
Sensor Network nodes act as sensor nodes, actuator nodes, clients and gateways. Sensor nodes 
can sense some data like temperature, pressure, humidity, power of light from the environment 
and forward it to the sink node that can process data to produce some control commands. The 
Border router is used between a WSN mesh network and the Internet. Nowadays WSN is mostly 
used for IoT applications and systems for its low power needs. 
 
     The wireless sensor network nodes are organized according to the topologies illustrated in 
Figure 2. Sensor nodes publish data to other nodes and receive status from other nodes to detect 
each other. Data forwarding process between nodes differs for different topologies. WSN devices 
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are battery dependent and spending low energy. Due to these energy-saving criteria, there is the 
possibility of security threats [22]. 
 
                  Star                                           Tree                                                            Mesh 
                                                                         
                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gateway  
       Router 
       End node 
Figure 2: Wireless Sensor Network Topologies [23] 
 
      Operating systems that are used for WSN are: Tiny OS, Contiki, MANTIS, BTunt [22]. Mostly 
common communication standards for WSN are 6LoWPAN, ZigBee and Bluetooth [22]. Some 
applications for wireless sensor network are the security system, healthcare, military applications, 
industrial applications, environmental monitoring, and smart buildings [23]. 
2.4 Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) 
      Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [24] is the newest version of Internet Protocol standardized 
by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to conquer old version IPv4 to get over new 
technical challenges. IPv6 uses 128 bits for each IPv6 address which means it has 2128 options 
for the addresses while IPv4 uses 32 bits only for each address. This extension of IP address 
length brings some benefits like the immense number of addresses, easier address management, 
end-to-end IPsec possibility, and address auto-configuration methods. IPv6 is not only differing 
on a large number of addresses than IPv4 but also offers divers improvements over IPv4 [25]: 
▪ Simplifies efficient routing process 
▪ Allocation of the hierarchical address 
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▪ Mandatory IPsec network layer security 
▪ Assure Quality of Service (QoS) in terms of performance 
▪ IPv6 provides Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) 
▪ Extension of the header without including any additional fields. 
2.5 6LoWPAN 
      6LoWPAN [24] is the acronym for IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks has 
been developed by IETF. It is a protocol used to transmit IP packets in networks based on IEEE 
802.15.4 standard. This 6LoWPAN concept comes with the idea of using low power devices with 
limited processing (CPU, Memory) capabilities as the network nodes for the Internet of Things 
(IoT). 6LoWPAN layers are presented in Figure 3. 
 
Application 
TCP/UDP 
IPv6 
6LoWPAN (Adaptation) 
 
 
IEEE 802.15.4 MAC 
IEEE 802.15.4 PHY 
Figure 3: 6LoWPAN Layers 
 
      The main goal of 6LoWPAN is to act as an adaptation layer between the standard IEEE 
802.15.4 and IPv6 [24]. It provides the encapsulation and header compression methods to solve 
the different packet size problems between IEEE 802.15.4 and IPv6 layers [24]. Stateless header 
compression is used to reduce the large IPv6 and UDP header to some bytes [24]. 
Communication range for 6LowPAN is 45 to 90 meters [22]. Some functions of the 6LoWPAN 
protocol are device and service discovery, security, packet size adaptation, address resolution 
and optimization [26]. Star and Mesh topologies are included in 6LoWPAN protocol [24]. Due to 
uncertain radio connectivity, battery drain, and physical difficulty devices supported by 6LoWPAN 
tends to be unreliable [24]. 
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2.6 Contiki 
      Contiki is an open source operating system for the Internet of Things (IoT) and Wireless 
Sensor Networks (WSN) [24]. It connects small microcontrollers with low cost and low power 
properties to the Internet [24]. It was developed by a group of developers from the Swedish 
Institute of Computer Science [27]. Contiki Applications are written in C programming language 
[27]. Contiki supports both IPv4 and IPv6 along with 6LoWPAN, RPL and COAP low-power 
wireless standards [24].  
 
       Instant Contiki consists of a single file download for users that have all tools and compilers 
included to ease software development for Contiki [27]. Some key features of Contiki OS are [27]: 
▪ Multi-tasking Operating System 
▪ Power and Memory efficient 
▪ Highly portable Operating System 
▪ Possible to load and unload application programs in run time using event-driven kernel 
 
2.7 TCP 
      Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is designed as a network communication protocol to 
transmit packet data between nodes over the Internet [28]. TCP is a transport layer protocol in 
the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. It was mainly designed for the wired network 
[29]. It is a connection-oriented protocol. Before data transmission between the source node and 
destination nodes, TCP establishes a connection between nodes. This connection establishment 
is renowned as handshaking, which needs three packets transmission before sending any user 
data packets. 
 
      TCP divides a large amount of data packet to smaller packets for transmission. Header size 
for TCP is 20 bytes, included in each packet. It sends all data packets sequentially. It provides 
acknowledgment (ACKs) for packets received by the destination node. If the source node does 
not receive the correct ACK from the receiver node then It resends the data packet [30]. Thus, 
TCP ensures data reliability and integrity. These make TCP communication process a bit slower. 
This protocol is responsible for error checking and error recovery. HTTP, HTTPs, FTP, SMTP 
protocols could be used as TCP traffic source [31]. Applications that need more reliability and 
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needs to receive data in a sequence like email, web browsing, files downloading uses TCP 
protocol. 
 
2.8 UDP 
      User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is similarly a communication protocol that is used to transmit 
data between nodes. It is a connectionless protocol. UDP does not need to establish any 
connection between sender and receiver before user data transmission. When an application 
using UDP protocol, it just sends all data packets to the destination directly. If the receiver does 
not receive data accurately or some part of the data is missing, UDP does not resending the data 
that is not reached correctly [30]. Thus, UDP is faster than TCP protocol but not ensuring data 
reliability and integrity. 
 
      UDP is responsible for error checking but does not attempt to recover error, just discard the 
packet. It is not receiving any acknowledgment from the destination node. UDP header size is 8 
bytes [14]. Data packets are not sent in any sequence. Each packet sent independently, and 
integrity is checked in the destination if the packets arrive [31]. DNS, DHCP, NFS, RIP protocols 
could be used as UDP traffic source [31]. Applications that do not need any error correction and 
needs faster data transmission like the online game, VoIP, video or audio streaming are suitable 
for UDP protocol. 
 
 
2.9 MQTT 
      MQ Telemetry Transport (MQTT) is a messaging protocol designed in 1999 and works on top 
of TCP/IP protocol [24]. Two types of messages “Publish and Subscribe” are used on an MQTT 
connection [32]. It is designed to minimize network bandwidth and to work with low resources 
consumption [24]. An MQTT broker is used to publish data on a specific topic and for receiving 
data on a topic.  
     MQTT Architecture is designed in Figure 4. A client node is publishing data with a topic name 
to the broker and the clients also can subscribe data from the broker with a specific topic name. 
The broker is ready to reply for data sending to the clients based on their requirements. MQTT 
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provides three different levels of Quality of Service (QoS) that defines how the messages are 
delivered between nodes [24]: 
• QoS 0: broker or client delivers the message once without any confirmation. 
• QoS 1: broker or client delivers the message with confirmation at least once. 
• QoS 2: broker or client delivers the message with four-step handshaking exactly once. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                Publish                                                                   
                                                                                                                              subscribe 
                                            publish & subscribe 
Figure 4: MQTT Architecture 
    
      MQTT minimizes protocol overheads and provides high-efficiency communication for IoT [32]. 
Furthermore, it reduces bandwidth consumption while at the same time increases scalability. It 
has keep-alive message function, if any clients disconnected broker can detect that node [24]. 
Broker keeps published data of a topic, therefore, if any new subscriber connected with the same 
topic can subscribe all data based on this topic from MQTT broker [24]. MQTT is mostly suitable 
for IoT because of remote sensing and controlling capability. It is possible to provide security by 
adding a username and password to the data packet in the protocol. 
 
 
 
 
  
Topic 2 
Topic 1 
Broker 
Publisher 
(Source) 
 
()(9 
Subscriber 
(Sink) 
Publisher and 
Subscriber 
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3.  IoT SECURITY AND CHALLENGES 
3.1 Security Issues in IoT 
      IoT can be defined as the internet of objects. IoT objects interact with the other components 
like mobile, data collectors, laptops, smart devices for data sharing, collecting and management 
in the context of service provided. With the rapid growth of IoT, IoT devices are responsible for 
transmitting and collecting a large number of data between devices. Due to the vast number of 
connected devices, there is a high risk of data stealing, device, and network manipulation. With 
the increasing number of IoT devices, security concerns are becoming the major issues all over 
the world. A research study on Internet of Things [33] by Hewlett-Packard Development 
Company, 2014 found that 80% of devices failed to require strong passwords, 60% did not use 
encryption during downloading software updates, 70% failed to encrypt data transmission via local 
network and the Internet and 80% of devices collecting personal information which could be 
harmful if it is transmitted by any devices without encryption. 
      IoT is the biggest revolution in the IT industry [34]. It is easier to conduct attacks on IoT 
devices. Some dynamic threats and challenges for IoT devices are listed below [34, 35, 36]: 
• Due to the lack of security mechanisms and impotent encryption process transmitted data 
can be attacked or misused by the unauthorized interference during the data transmission 
across the network. Maintaining data integrity and confidentiality are must be needed 
during data transmission. 
• Personal information or messages from the sender to the receiver can be affected by the 
attacker and wrong information can be sent [37].  
• IoT devices are resource constrained means they have limited computational and storage 
capabilities. It is not possible for the developers to adding required features to defend 
against the security threats. 
• Life becomes easier with the use of IoT that provides several facilities to everyday lives. 
But it influences the users’ privacy [38] [39] [40]. If the IoT device compromised the 
collected data, then it will be difficult for the user to keep trust in IoT. 
• Some security vulnerabilities in network services like Exploitable UDP Services, DoS via 
Network Device Fuzzing, Buffer Overflow, Denial-of-Service [41], [42], [43]might allow an 
attacker to acquire unauthorized access to the IoT device. 
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• Insecure cloud interface [44], [45], [46], [47], [48] and insecure mobile interface due to the 
poor authentication and unencrypted data transmission might allow unauthorized access 
to the device and the collected data. 
• If the web interface that is used to the user and device interaction is not secure, then it is 
easier for the attackers to gain access to the IoT device. 
• In some IoT applications, device life is shorter, and some applications have longer device 
life. Security techniques should be designed based on device lifetime and application. If 
the device life is longer than it should have the option to update security features to defend 
from new attacks and security threats. 
• Open source software is useful for quick development in IoT systems. To protect from 
malicious attacks, developers need to be careful to choose the software and for open 
source software validity must have a framework. Most of the IoT edge devices use same 
open source software which may have the same vulnerabilities. It increases the possibility 
of full system collapse if an attacker uses the same vulnerabilities to all edge devices and 
attacks all network devices.  
     To protect devices from the above-mentioned security threats it is important not only to provide 
reliable but also realistic (i.e. efficient) solutions. As the IoT devices are resource constrained, it 
is not possible to directly employ the traditional security mechanisms like the other Internet 
devices. There are some limitations to apply traditional security schemes directly in the IoT 
devices based on hardware, software, and network which are discussed below [49]: 
• Most of the IoT devices are battery dependent. Thus, using low power CPU that has the 
lowest computation power is considered as of paramount importance. However, using such 
a processor makes it difficult to execute computationally heavy cryptographic algorithms.  
• IoT devices have limited memory than other traditional devices and use a lightweight 
version of Operating System. Therefore, traditional security algorithms cannot be used in 
these devices with small memory as the process might not get enough space after booting 
up the operating system and some software. However, Traditional security algorithms are 
not designed with memory efficiency consideration. 
• Sometimes IoT devices are needed to place in some remote area and not possible to 
monitoring continuously. If a single IoT device from a network is attacked by an 
unauthorized person, an attacker might change the programs of the device or may replace 
the device with another malicious node. 
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• Installing a dynamic security scheme in IoT device is not possible as the operating system 
and protocol stack might not be able to receive and integrate new code and library.  
• IoT devices might use IP networking to communicate with IoT service provider and 
proprietary network protocol for network communication simultaneously. For these 
characteristics of IoT devices, traditional security methods become unsuitable for the 
devices. 
• An IoT device can join or leave the network at any time and this adding or removing device 
characteristics make a network topology dynamic. Security models that exist for the digital 
systems do not work duly with these topological changes.  
• IoT devices might be connected via wired or wireless link to the local and global network. 
It is difficult to find any security protocol that can work for both wired and wireless 
connectivity. 
 
3.2 Protocols for IoT Layers and Security 
      A Protocol is the set of rules that are used by the end node of a network connection to 
communicate with the other end nodes of the same network or the different network. In this 
subsection 3.2, IoT layers are mentioned in Figure 5 and the most common security protocols 
listed in Table 1 that are used for Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication in IoT different 
layers will be described briefly. 
      Perception Layer is responsible for data collection. It is the lowest layer of the IoT. This layer 
uses sensors and actuators to perform different measurements like temperature, humidity, and 
pressure. IoT nodes perform the required function for data collection and RFID, ZigBee, some 
other sensor nodes are involved in this layer [50]. It is important to secure this layer to protect the 
data that could be damaged by a malicious attack. Some possible security threats are DoS attack, 
routing attack and hardware damage. Attackers can destroy a sensor node by replacing the node 
or by electronically interrogating the nodes to get the access and to change the important 
information. Physical security like abnormal sensor reading detection and cryptographic elements 
implementation has to be provided at the perception layer [50]. 
 
     Network Layer in IoT is the same as the TCP/IP network layer. Data transmission is the main 
task of this layer. Similar to the traditional TCP/IP network layer this layer has several security 
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issues as well. Some of those common security threats are unauthorized access to the networks, 
lack of confidentiality and data integrity, DoS attack, storage attack, eavesdropping information, 
gateway attack and so on [50]. To protect the network layer from such attack key management, 
precise authentication, unauthorized access detection, and negotiation should be implemented.  
 
                                                                                        
                                                                              Camera                               RFID 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
                                                                                 
                                                                        Hospital                        Wearable device                 Smart Home 
Figure 5: IoT Layered Architecture [51]  
       
      Application Layer provides the services that are requested by the user. There is no universal 
standard for the IoT application layer construction as because of the availability of many different 
devices and manufacturers [50]. This layer can provide high-quality services to meet user 
demands. A large number of devices and nodes makes it challenging for the layer to secure data 
efficiently because of the massive amount of data and information transformation. Availability of 
so many different applications and the user makes it difficult to manage authentication and 
authorization. There are many security threats to the application layer. Attackers can steal user 
data by known application vulnerabilities. If the coders are not more conscious about their codes 
in the application, attackers can upload malicious codes which can lead to the software attack. 
Attackers can destroy the complete application or service. 
 
Application 
Layer 
Perception 
Layer 
Network 
Layer 
Wireless 
and Wired 
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IoT Layer IoT Protocol Security Protocol 
Application MQTT, COAP User defined 
Transport UDP DTLS 
Network IPv6, RPL IPsec, RPL security 
Adoptation 6LoWPAN --- 
Perception IEEE 802.15.4 802.15.4 security 
Table 1: IoT layers and protocols [52] 
 
3.2.1 IEEE 802.15.4 Protocol and Security 
     IoT PHY and MAC both layers are supported by the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol [10] which was 
established in 2003. It was designed as a principle for a protocol stack towards short range and 
energy efficient communication. The frequency band 2.42 GHz is mostly used for this protocol. It 
supports short-range communication at 250 Kbit/s. IEEE 802.15.4 security is implemented in the 
MAC layer, not designed for the PHY layer.  IEEE 802.15.4 PHY layer is responsible to manage 
signal, energy and channel selection [53]. IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer provides other services like 
physical channel access, frames validity, time slots, and security and node organizations [53]. 
Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA/CA) method is used to avoid collisions during data 
transmissions. MAC layer provides multiple security levels.  
 
     IEEE 802.15.4 protocol has a stable mechanism and it provides various security services [10]. 
The security depends on symmetric cryptography and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This 
provides data authentication, data encryption, and confidentiality. Access control is another 
security service that can activate the nodes to find more security information for processing the 
security of the message [10]. Security-enabled flag inside the control field of the frame used to 
secure MAC frames during the communication [54]. Auxiliary Security Header is responsible to 
have information about the frame security and security enabled control flag is responsible for the 
signals of the presence of this header. A new feature known as Time Synchronized Channel 
Hopping was introduced in 2008 which provides services to protect from replay attacks. It requires 
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acknowledgment-based or frame-based synchronization between end devices. Receiver node 
calculates the difference between the estimated arrival time and the exact arrival time of a frame 
and then send it to the sender with the acknowledgment to synchronize the time clock according 
to receiver’s clock [53]. The usage of Absolute Slot Number (ASN) that stores the total number of 
timeslots as a global frame counter value can be used to protect from the replay attack and 
semantic attack [53]. But the IEEE 802.15.4 specification does not define how to do key 
management. Reem et al [10] state that, “the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol security has a limitation that 
it is not using key management model for the cases in which the end nodes might reuse the nonce 
value”. The AES-128 block cipher uses 128-bit symmetric keys, but the upper layers are 
responsible to do the key generation, distribution, and replacement [54]. 
 
3.2.2 6LoWPAN Protocol and Security 
       The IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) is a network 
protocol standardized by IETF to enable direct connection to the Internet for constrained resource 
devices [54]. The widely supported standard IEEE 802.15.4 for low-power wireless embedded 
communications released in 2003 was the reason for 6LoWPAN standardization. The first 
6LoWPAN specification was introduced in 2007. 6LoWPAN defines a set of rules that are 
generally used to integrate all sensor nodes into IPv6 networks. It supports star and mesh 
topologies and the combination of both star and mesh topology.  As it supports low-power, low 
cost, battery supplied, IP-driven devices and large mesh network, it is becoming a suitable option 
for the Internet of Things (IoT) applications. It defines the frame format and header compression 
mechanisms for IPv6 packets during the transmission over IEEE 802.15.4 networks [54]. Different 
specifications have been developed to support IPv6 over Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and some 
other networks.  
     This 6LoWPAN protocol has the freedom of physical layer and frequency band [10]. It is 
possible for the constrained devices to establish network connectivity with any other IPv6 enabled 
device using the 6LoWPAN protocol. The adaptation layer can be classified in various RFC 
(Request for Comments) documents. RFC 4919 is responsible to discuss the goals and 
assumptions used to perform the works by the group of IETF 6LoWPAN [53]. RFC 6282 presents 
how the UDP header compression could be done following the context of the 6LoWPAN 
adaptation layer [53]. RFC 4944 defines the mechanisms that are used to transmit IPv6 packets 
over IEEE 802.15.4 networks with header compressions [53]. RFC 6606 represents the 
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6LoWPAN routing requirements. 6LoWPAN adaptation layer does not contain any special 
security mechanisms. It relies on the security mechanisms that are available for the lower layer 
(Section 3.2.1-IEEE 802.15.4 security) or upper layer (Section 3.2.4-COAP) for securing 
communications [41]. But the adaptation layer RFC documents include some of the security 
vulnerabilities and requirements to consider the importance of network-layer security [40]. 
Identification was one of the problems that represent RFC 4944 is involved with the possibility of 
extracting EUI-64 interface that can compromise the 6LoWPAN unique interface identifier [40]. 
RFC 4944 document is also involved with the discussion of mesh routing mechanisms and 
neighbor discovery on IEEE 802.15.4 which might be a threat to security. MAC layer AES security 
may provide some fundamentals for developing the mechanisms to protect from such threats [40].  
The usage of compression UDP was another major issue which reduces an UDP port numbers 
(16) to 4 bits [7]. Hence, it creates the possibility of receiving the wrong message or incorrect 
payload by an application [7]. Difference between 6LoWPAN and IP protocol stack is presented 
in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: 6LowPAN vs. Traditional IP Protocol Stack [55] 
 
      Jorge Granjal et. al [53] has mentioned some possible solutions for the protection from the 
security threats. The use of Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) for end-to-end IoT provides 
authentication and encryption at the network layer. Design of compressed security header for the 
6LowPAN Protocol Stack  IP Protocol Stack 
CoAP, XMPP Application HTTTP, XMPP 
UDP, ICMPv6 Transport TCP, UDP, ICMP 
IPv6 Network IP 
6LowPAN adaptation   
IEEE 802.15.4, BLE, PLC Data Link Ethernet 
  
CoAP - Constrained Application Protocol 
XMPP – Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol 
6LowPAN – IPv6 over Low Power Personal Area Networks 
BLE – Bluetooth Low Energy 
PLC – Power-line Communication 
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Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) for 6LoWPAN in transport 
and tunnel modes was another proposed solution [10]. Security implementation against packet 
fragmentation attacks was one more approach. The fragmentation attacks may cause the buffer 
overflow or the misuse of available computational capability. The proposed solution is to add a 
new field namely timestamp for the protection against unidirectional replays and a nonce for the 
protection against bidirectional replays to the fragmentation header of 6LoWPAN to solve these 
issues [53]. Key Management is one of the important security functionalities to ensure long-term 
and effective security for applications. One possible solution for key management is to reduce the 
payload information and IKE headers using the 6LoWPAN protocol [10]. 
 
3.2.3 RPL Protocol and Security 
       RPL is a lightweight IPv6 distance vector routing protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks 
(LLNs) was standardized in 2011 by the IETF group with a goal of providing routing solutions for 
IoT. It supports Point-to-point, Multipoint-to-point, and Point-to-multipoint traffic patterns [24]. 
Different functions can be used based on scenarios for the path selection in the RPL routing 
protocol to make the network more efficient and for flexible structure [56]. RPL builds a Destination 
Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) for each root device which is identified by a DODAGID 
[53]. RPL can response on a sudden topology change of the network and is able to provide optimal 
path selection based on functions [56]. The RPL routing protocol supports several types of control 
messages and all these messages are encapsulated in ICMPv6 packets [53]. In table 2 functions 
of these control messages are listed. 
RPL Control Messages Functions 
DODAG Information Object (DIO) Carries information to join a DODAG which 
exists and select list of parents. 
DODAG Information Solicitation (DIS) Request for a DIO message from a RPL node. 
Destination Advertisement Object (DAO) Used to propagate destination and routing 
information from leaf nodes to the root. 
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DAO Acknowledgment (DAO-ACK) Sent by the parent as an acknowledgment on 
the reception of DAO. 
Consistency Check (CC) Used to synchronize counter values among 
communicating nodes. 
Table 2: RPL control messages with functions 
 
      The current RPL specifications include SHA-256 to use digital signatures and AES/CCM 
including128-bit keys for MAC to support authenticity and integrity [53]. RPL message is entirely 
maintaining RPL security. In an RPL ICMPv6 message, IPv6 header and the ICMPv6 header is 
not encrypted but this fields required for the correct packet decryption. A Consistency Check RPL 
control message can help a sensor device to establish a challenge response with a motive to 
authenticating the counter value of another node [10]. For example, if any receiver is maintaining 
incoming counter value for message originator while a message is received with the initialized 
counter value, then the receiver can start resynchronization with the sender by sending a 
consistency check message to the source [53]. This counter fields technique provides security 
against replay attacks. 
 
Self-configuration The path of networks are dynamically discovered using IPv6 
neighbor discovery mechanisms. 
Routing Type Source routing and Distance-vector routing. 
Target Networks 6LowPAN network, Low Power and Lossy networks and 
other IPv6 networks. 
Identifiers RPL instance ID, DODAG ID, DODAG version and Rank. 
Traffic Flows P2P, MP2P and P2MP. 
Data Transmission  Unicast and Multicast. 
Table 3: RPL Features [55] 
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     Table 3 represents some key features of RPL protocol. RPL also has three different security 
modes which can be applied to routing control messages [53]: 
• Unsecured: RPL uses this mode as default. It does not apply any additional security to the 
routing control messages. 
• Preinstalled: The security is applied by a node to join the RPL instance as a router or host 
device using a preconfigured symmetric key. This symmetric key is used to provide data 
authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity for RPL control messages. 
• Authenticated: RPL applies this security mode only to the routers. When a device joining 
the network with a preconfigured symmetric key means using preinstalled mode since it 
can obtain a cryptographic key from the authority to act as a router. The authentication 
and authorization of the devices are assured by the key authority. 
      The RPL specifications recently define that it is not mandatory to use symmetric cryptography 
to support the authenticated mode, but how the asymmetric cryptography can be used to 
authenticity and to retrieve the key by the node which is ready to act as the router is not specified. 
The future RPL versions may clarify this issue. Lack of security mechanisms and internal attacks 
are the limitations of RPL security. Adding version number, authentication based on signatures 
and one-way hash chain can be used to protect against the internal attack [10]. 
 
3.2.4 CoAP Protocol and Security 
       Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [57] is a web transfer protocol, developed for 
constrained networks and constrained nodes in IoT [58]. IETF designed CoAP using a subset of 
the HTTP methods to target constrained devices [59]. It uses REST (Representational State 
Transfer) architecture where resources are identified by Universal Resource Identifier (URI) [60]. 
REST is commonly used with HTTP but runs over UDP for the transactions [10]. The main goal 
for developing CoAP protocol is to match the special requirements of IoT especially machine-to-
machine (M2M) applications and considering energy [57]. Some key features of CoAP protocol 
are [57] [58]: 
• Constrained web protocol supports M2M requirements. 
• Asynchronous message exchanges. 
• UDP protocol binding to avoid TCP handshakes 
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• Supports content-type and Universal Resource Identifier. 
• UDP supports uni-cast and multi-cast requests. 
• Security binding to Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). 
• Simple proxy and caching capabilities. 
• Parsing complexity and Low header overhead. 
• HTTP mapping for integration with existing networks and Web technologies. 
• Confirmable and Acknowledgement messages can be used to provide reliable 
communications. 
                                                                     Request 
                                        Client                                                                 Server 
                                                                      Response 
                                    Figure 7: Client-server model in CoAP 
 
       CoAP architecture can be divided into two different layers: response/request layer and 
message layer [10]. The message layer is responsible for exchanging messages between end 
nodes over UDP while the second layer is used to response on transferred messages to avoid 
arrival delay, packet lost. CoAP is a reliable protocol with some valuable features like multicast 
requests, retransmissions and duplicate detection [10]. The communication between CoAP server 
and client is peer-to-peer [57]. CoAP uses binary format for message encoding and a fixed-length 
binary header. Each message contains message ID for reliability and to detect duplicate of the 
message [57]. To provide reliability sender sends message as Confirmable (CON) with message 
ID and recipient sends back Acknowledgement (ACK) with the same message ID [57]. If the 
recipient fails to process a Confirmable message, it sends back Reset (RST) message instead of 
ACK [57]. Four different methods are defined in CoAP based on RESTful architecture [60] [10]: 
• GET: is used for retrieving resource representation identified by URI request. 
• POST: is used for transferring information representation. 
• PUT: is used for updating resources on server. 
• DELETE: is used for deleting identified resources by the URI request. 
 
       CoAP protocol requires additional protocol to provide security as like the traditional protocols 
[50]. Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) and IPsec is generally used for the message 
encryption. DTLS protocol is applicable to the transport layer. The basic encryption algorithms 
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AES/CCM provides authentication, integrity and confidentiality. DTLS adds 13 bytes/ datagrams 
overhead after the initial handshake process completed [51]. 6LowPAN header employs10 bytes 
of IPv6 header while 4 bytes are required by the CoAP header therefore, the DTLS compression 
is needed [50]. DTLS also can provide security for replay attacks using a nonce value to each 
CoAP packet and each nonce value should be different from another [40]. Figure 8 represents 
the CoAP Architecture for constrained node networks. 
 
Figure 8: CoAP architecture [61] 
                                              
     In addition to DTLS security protocol, CoAP defines four different security modes that can be 
used in the applications are [49] [7]: 
• NoSec: This mode does not provide any security and CoAP messages are not including 
any security elements before transmission. 
• PreSharedKey: This mode is used by the devices that are pre-cofigured with symmetric 
cryptographic keys to confirm secure communication. Applications can use one key for 
group of devices or one key for one device. This is suitable for the devices that does not 
supports public key cryptography.  
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• RawPublicKey: It requires public key for authentication. Devices using this method are 
programmed with the list of asymmetric keys so the devices does not need any certificate 
to start a DTLS session. 
• Certificates: This mode also supports authentication with public key and the applications 
that are participating to certificate chain for checking the validity of certificates. Devices 
that has asymmetric key pair and an X.509 certificate that can be validated using 
certificates mode and root keys. 
      ECC (Ecliptic Curve Cryptography) is public key cryptography which supports both 
RawPublicKey and Certificates modes [51]. ECC using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm (ECDSA) to support device authentication and for key agreement using the Elliptic 
Curve Diffie-Hellman Algorithm with Ephemeral keys (ECDHE) [40]. The devices using NoSec 
security mode sending packets without any security elements, using “coap” method in URI 
addresses [51]. In addition, different modes need to support mandatory-to-implement cipher suite 
for each mode based on AES/CCM and ECC. Applications with PreSharedKey mode supports 
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 suite for the authentication using pre shared key and 8-byte 
nonce value [53]. The RawPublicKey security mode required 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 suite using ECDSA-capable public keys [51].  
This mode uses SHA-256 to compute hash function. Applications using Certificates mode also 
required TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 security suite and supports public key 
transport in X.509 certificate [40]. 
     CoAP security is still under scrutiny because of the controversy and challenges to implement 
security elements. Maintaining the high performance as well as managing security and protection 
together is the biggest challenge. To provide end-to-end security in CoAP protocol DTLS can be 
implemented as the official application layer security protocol but DTLS also has some limitations 
[10]. Since DTLS was not designed for constrained devices [62], it is heavyweight protocol with 
long headers. The long header of DTLS is compressed by using 6LowPAN as well as the large 
message and handshake compression is also needed [62]. DTLS does not support the CoAP 
proxy modes [10]. In addition, the author [63] indicates that in some end-to-end communication 
process a HTTP client needs the CoAP server in the backend to access resources. A mapping is 
required between CoAP and HTTP in the application layer and 6LowPAN Border Router (6lbr) 
cab be used as proxy [63]. To ensure if there is a malicious code the proxy must translate the 
packet without scanning [10]. Here the challenge is multi-cast messages in group communications 
are not supported by DTLS. Hence it is possible to translate the proxy from HTTP to CoAP and 
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has to decide the message as uni-cast or multi-cast [10]. As like all other protocols robust key 
management could be the solution for CoAP [10]. Key Management can help to ensure security 
standards that are applied and to solve the multi-cast message issue in DTLS [10]. 
 
Figure 9: DTLS Handshake Process [61] 
      
3.2.5 MQTT Protocol 
       MQTT [11] is an application layer protocol as like CoAP which is designed by Andy Stanford-
Clark and Arlen Nipper [62]. MQTT protocol standard v3.1.1 is widely used for IoT system. A client 
device using MQTT always establishes connection to the server. A client publishes application 
message to the server/broker that is interesting topic to other clients in the network. All published 
data to the server has a specific topic name. Client can subscribe to request application message 
that it is interested to receive and can unsubscribe to remove a request [63]. Application message 
is the data carried by MQTT protocol across the network. Server acts as an intermediary between 
clients which are publishing and subscribing application messages on same topic. Some sessions 
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between clients and the server lasts as long as the network connection and others can be 
connected consecutively [63].  
      MQTT protocol do not have overall security mechanism. It does not include encryption 
capabilities but only has authentication mechanism [62]. A MQTT Mosquitto broker can 
authenticate the client connection using three different ways: client id, username and passwords, 
client certificates [64]. 
• Client ID: All clients must have a client ID. When a client wants to subscribe a topic, client 
id links the topic to the client and to the TCP connection. MQTT broker remembers client 
id and subscribed topic. To provide client security Mosquitto broker allows to impose client 
id prefix restrictions on the client name [64]. 
• Username and passwords: To establish a connection with client, an MQTT broker requires 
a valid username and password from the client. The username and password is 
transmitted using a clear text which is not secure without transport encryption form like 
SSL [64]. 
• Client certificates (X.509): A digital certificate provided by the recognized authority to each 
client which is used for Transport Layer Security (TLS). It is the most secure authentication 
method but difficult to implement on large number of clients [64].  
 
3.3 CoAP and MQTT 
      Both the IoT application layer protocol CoAP and MQTT are described in the previous 
sections. Different IoT applications are commonly using these two protocols based on the protocol 
features. Some of the key differences between CoAP and MQTT are discussed in Table 4. 
Features CoAP MQTT 
Communication 
Model 
Publish-Subscribe or Request-
Response 
Publish-Subscribe 
Messaging Synchronous and Asynchronous Asynchronous 
Header size 4 bytes 2 bytes 
RESTful Yes No 
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Application reliability Confirmable and Non-Confirmable 
messages, Acknowledgements and 
Retransmissions 
3 levels Quality of Service 
Transport Layer UDP-based but TCP can be used TCP-based but UDP can be used 
Application Layer Single Layer with two sub-layer 
Messages Layer and Request-
Response Layer 
Single Layer 
Security DTLS or IPSec Not defined  
Performance Lower overhead and packet loss Lower delays 
Table 4: Differences between CoAP and MQTT [65] 
 
3.4 DTLS Security Protocol 
     Datagram Transport Layer Security is employed as the security protocol to provide a secure 
channel between constrained nodes to transfer secure application messages [12]. Constrained-
Node Networks (CNN) should concentrate on the device lightweight-ness before the security 
implementation. Traditional security protocols are not suitable for constrained nodes since the 
resources are limited [12]. The DICE (DTLS In Constrained Environments) group is delivering 
absolute efforts to support the use of DTLS for IoT environments [66]. Now, some of the hardware 
designer of constrained nodes started to integrate additional cryptographic modules as well as 
AES. However, still now there are no specific cryptographic algorithms that is designed 
specifically for CNN [12].  
     CNN relies on the UDP protocol for data transmission due to the simple connection-less 
architecture of this protocol. But operating connection-less protocol is more complex than the 
connection-oriented protocol while for flow control it does not maintain any sequence number. 
Employing security functionalities on UDP protocol is also complex. DTLS is one of the protocols 
to secure UDP for CNN. Many works have been done by the IETF standardization group DICE to 
fit large and heavy DTLS into CN as it was not designed for CNN [12]. DTLS is a heavy protocol 
for constrained IoT devices in terms of time duration and energy consumption. It consists of three 
sub-protocols which are handshake protocol, alert protocol and change cipher spec protocol [67]. 
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     Figure 9 represents the DTLS handshake process. To establish a secure end-to-end 
connection DTLS handshake process uses three rounds of message communication. To prevent 
DOS attack for multiple ‘ClientHello’ message transmission, cookie mechanism is added to the 
first hello transmission. Server and client negotiate the cipher suite to use in their sessions after 
all mutual hello message transmission done. At last after the reception of ‘Finished’ message both 
devices start to exchange encrypted messages which is not possible to decrypt by the third party 
[12]. This handshake process requires various message exchanges between client and server 
which is a heavy process for constrained nodes. In the networks with low transmission quality like 
CNN, retransmission of handshake messages occurs as regular practice. While the handshake 
process should be completed to start the secure session, it is important to analyze the network 
condition earlier.  
     Session duration is important to constrained nodes because the setup of repeated session 
requires the additional handshake. Session restarting process is specified in the standard to avoid 
the complete handshake every time. However, excessive session preservation could be the 
reason for poor performance of servers, specifically if servers are constrained devices. Hence, 
administrator should examine the network flow first and then they can start configuring the session 
duration and session resumption. Longer session duration increases the possibility of being 
affected by the attackers [12]. To process DTLS in constrained nodes required memory buffer is 
needed. In the DTLS standard 214 bytes are fixed as maximum plaintext fragment length. For this, 
in ‘ClientHello’ message an extension of Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation can be added, 
which allows the client to inform the server how much memory buffers (maximum size) it can use 
[12]. Among all application layer protocols for CNN, CoAP and LwM2M has defined the usage of 
DTLS protocol to establish a secure communication. 
     DTLS uses three different authentication modes to setup the secure communication are [66] 
[12]:  
• Pre-shared Key (PSK) based Authentication: To use this mode for authentication, the 
secret key should be known to the server and client previously. This secret key needs to 
be made of various random combinations to keep it safe from adversary attack. Each PSK 
pair forms with a client ID and the corresponding secret key. Hence, server should know 
the correspond PSK pair for the client that the client will use to connect to it beforehand. 
This Pre-shared key mode is the most popular authentication mode that consumes less 
bandwidth and limited resources [12]. 
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• Raw Public Key (RPK) based Authentication: RPK is lightweight in comparison to 
traditional PKI and does not require any additional structure to convey the public key. It 
stores the information of public key into the ‘SubjectPublicKeyInfo’ field of the existing 
certificate message structure. To exchange the public keys, additional messages and 
‘server_certificate_type’ and ‘client_certificate_type’ are used in the handshake process 
[12]. 
• Certificate based Authentication: This Certificate based Authentication mode provides 
the highest security level. It provides mutual authentication. Since it generates a large 
communication overhead, it requires the use of cached info extension to minimize the 
overhead. For this extension, there is no need to send the entire certificate chain by the 
server in every DTLS handshake [12]. 
     Cipher-suites that are used for these three different authentication modes in CoAP protocol 
are already mentioned in section 3.2.4. These cipher-suites for different credential types need 
AES for their confidentiality. To provide AES functionality embedded hardware module or software 
library can be used. Constrained nodes are encouraged to use embedded hardware module to 
achieve the performance efficiencies for example low network latency and lowest power 
consumption [12]. If a device chip does not support hardware module, then have to use the 
software AES in it. However, software AES is not efficient for high speed required applications or 
real time applications and it also requires higher memory than the hardware AES. Therefore, now 
manufacturers started to load AES in hardware as well as other modules like SHA, CCM and 
even Public Key HW Accelerator driver for ECC calculation [12]. 
3.5 The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
     Advanced Encryption Standard [1] is a symmetric key algorithm. Symmetric key algorithms 
are used for cryptography in which only one key is used to encrypt plaintext and to decrypt the 
ciphertext [68]. It uses fixed block size. AES contains three block ciphers AES-128, AES-192 and 
AES-256 [1]. Each of these ciphers using a block length of 128, 192 and 256 bits respectively. 
Both the sender and receiver must have to know the same secret key. AES-128 uses 10 rounds 
for 128-bit keys, 192-bit uses 12 rounds and 14 rounds for 256-bit keys [1]. A round is used to 
process several steps including substitution, transposition and finally to transform the plaintext to 
the ciphertext. AES key features and advantages are presented in Table 5. 
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Features Operations Advantages 
AES gives full specification and 
details of design. 
It performs computations on 
bytes. 
AES provides high/fast 
security. 
It uses larger key sizes. In the final round, it 
performs XOR operation to 
get the ciphertext. 
It uses low power consumption. 
It is faster and stronger than DES. The number of rounds in 
AES is variable and 
depends on the key length. 
AES is fast equally in hardware 
and software implementation. 
AES design is based on 
substitution-permutation network. 
AES uses 128-bits block as 
16 bytes which is arranged 
in 4x4 matrix. 
For 128 bits, almost 2128 
attempts are needed to break. 
So, it is difficult to hack it. 
Table 5: AES Features and Advantages [69] 
      AES has two main functions: key schedule and round transformation. Key schedule is a 
process that derives the round keys from the cipher key. AES algorithm defines number of round 
transformations to be performed on the data stored in an array. The first step is to put the data 
into an array. Then the cipher transformations are repeated over several encryption rounds. The 
first encryption round is the substitution of data using a fixed substitution table. The second round 
shifts the data rows where each row is shifted to the left and then the mixing of columns using 
special mathematical function [65]. In the next transformation a simple XOR operation performed 
between the 4x4 matrix and the encryption key [63]. 
3.6 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
     Elliptic Curve Cryptography [70] is an asymmetric key algorithm that is using public key 
encryption technique to create efficient cryptographic keys. Asymmetric key algorithm uses pair 
of keys: public key and private key to complete the message encryption and decryption process. 
If the message is encrypted using a public key from the pair, then it is only possible to decrypt 
using the other private key of the same pair. ECC algorithm was first proposed for cryptography 
in 1985 by Neal Koblitz (University of Washington), and Victor S. Miller (IBM) [71] [2]. It can be 
used in conjunction with some asymmetric encryption methods such as Diffie-Hellman and RSA. 
Instead of using some traditional methods ECC uses the properties of the elliptic curve equation 
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to generate keys. According to researchers, this method can accomplish the same level of 
security with 164-bit key while other system requires 1024-bit key [72]. Elliptic curve supports 
several cryptographic schemes such as: 
• Key agreement scheme (ECDH, ECDHE): Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is a 
method where clients can agree for an elliptic curve public/private key pair over an 
insecure channel which is normally used to derive another secret key. This derived key 
can be used for symmetric key cipher. It is also possible to share the key directly but due 
to the Diffie-Hellman exchange it contains weak bits. Hash of this shared key can be used 
as solution to remove the weak bits [67].  
• Encryption scheme (ECIES, PSEC): Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme 
(ECIES) is a public key mechanism that provides encryption, key exchange capabilities 
and digital signature. It is responsible to organize both message authentication scheme 
and symmetric key encryption [67]. 
• Digital signature scheme (ECDSA): Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm is based 
on the elliptic curve cryptography and it has important differences in comparison to the 
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). It uses ECC private key to sign the data and for the 
signature verification uses ECC public key. For the process repetition the signature of the 
data changes because of the involvement of a random value in the ECDSA algorithm. This 
random value is automatically created by the signature creation process and during 
signature verification it is recalculated [68]. Some key features and advantages of ECC 
are presented in Table 6. 
 
Features Advantages 
ECC uses a shorter encryption key. The shorter ECC key is faster. 
It provides same level of security strength like 
RSA but uses much shorter key length than 
RSA. 
Due to the use of a key with a shorter length, 
the generated ciphertexts and signatures are 
also smaller. 
It uses public key and private key for each 
node. 
It requires less computational power in 
comparison to other asymmetric encryption 
methods such as RSA. 
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Most suitable for wireless devices with limited 
memory and computing power. 
Signatures can be computed in two stages, 
allowing latency much lower than inverse 
throughput. 
Table 6: ECC Features and Advantages 
      
3.7 Security Threats in IoT Application Layer 
      Security is the most important topic for IoT. The main goal of IoT security is to provide reliable 
connection, confidentiality and providing proper authentication mechanisms about the transmitted 
data for each node connected to the network. Many security principles should be enabled to each 
IoT layer for efficient use of the IoT applications. Security threats to any part of the Data integrity, 
confidentiality and data availability could be the serious reason behind the damage to the system. 
There are many security threats to IoT application layer, and it is also challenging to overcome 
these security problems. Some of the possible application layer security problems are: 
• DOS attack where the attacker behaves like an authorized user, login to the system and 
interrupt normal activities of the network [3]. 
• Phishing attack in which hacker succeed to achieve the credential access of an 
authenticated user and damage data using email of the network authority [3]. 
• Malicious code injection is the technique where attacker injects some malicious code into 
the system to manipulate user data or to steal data [3]. 
• Sniffing attack in which hacker commence a sniffer application into the system to force an 
attack on it to reach the network information [3]. 
     To solve the above mentioned IoT application layer security threats it is important to employ 
some possible steps. However sometimes for some cases it becomes difficult to apply proper 
solutions to solve the security problems. Sowmya et al. [3] presented the difficulties related to 
security to overcome the security threats and some possible security measures to succeed the 
problems related to security which are discussed below and in table 7: 
• Authentication of User ID: At the same time different users’ requests for different 
applications. Each application has large number of users. Hence, to prevent the network 
from unauthorized access proper authentication mechanism should be deployed [3]. 
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• Data Handling: A huge number of network user involves with the large amount of data 
processing. During the communication process it makes the possibility of data loss which 
can affect network efficiency [3]. 
• Data storage: The data storage comprises data transmission using different channels to 
several locations which includes data integrity and user privacy. There is a high risk of 
attack during data transmission, so it is important to organize appropriate data storage 
and recovery at every steps of data transmission [3]. 
• Software vulnerabilities: Due to the non-standard codes in software, vulnerabilities of 
software may occur. Such software bugs might be exploited by an adversary and allowed 
him to launch powerful attacks [3]. 
 
Risk assessment This process can identify the threats in the network. It can be used to 
analyze situation and to check the level of risk acceptance. 
Intrusion Detection This method can produce alarm on any ambiguous activity in the network 
and provides solution for threats by cloud computing, uninterrupted 
monitoring and virtualization. 
Data Security To preserve data from unauthorized user encryption methodologies can be 
includes. In addition, updated malwares and up-to-date anti-dos-firewalls 
can be included to achieve data security. 
Table 7:  Security measures [3] 
 
3.8 IoT Security Challenges 
      IoT opens great opportunities for devices, software and applications to share information and 
communicate over the internet. This shared data may contain many private information of users. 
Hence, it is important to protect this information from any possible adversary that might try to get 
unauthorized access. Due to the heterogeneity and large scale of objects in IoT new security 
issues emerges compared to traditional security aspects. These IoT security problems are more 
complex than the traditional problems. Some possible IoT attack surfaces are presented in table 
7. To provide the proper solution for security problems IoT must encounter numerous challenges 
[73] that are presented below: 
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• Authentication and Authorization: Public-key cryptosystem can provide the 
authentication process or authorization but without global root certificate authority it is 
difficult to design the complete authentication scheme for IoT. In addition, it may not be 
feasible to issue certificate for large number of objects as IoT often designed with a huge 
number of objects [73]. 
• Privacy: The IoT challenges to privacy preserving can be divided into data anonymization 
and data collection process. Data collection process describes type of data, amount of 
information and the access control of a device to the data. If the collected data and private 
information storage is restricted than ensuring the privacy is possible. Cryptographic 
protection and secrecy of data relations are required to ensure data anonymity. For IoT 
resource constrained devices lightweight cryptographic methods are suitable. Data 
encryption can be used to maintain the secrecy of data relations. Hence, the encrypted 
data computation for data anonymization is a challenge for IoT constrained devices [73]. 
• Object Identification: For object identification main challenge is to assure the integrity of 
records in the naming architecture. Although DNS system provides name translation 
services, but it is not a secure naming system. Domain Name Service Security Extension 
(DNSSEC, IETF) is extended as the DNS security extension which ensures the 
authenticity and integrity of resource records. DNSSEC requires high communication and 
computation overhead hence for IoT devices this naming scheme might not be suitable. 
Therefore, it is still challenging for IoT to overcome this problem. 
• Malware: As because the IoT devices has limited resources so the threat specifically 
targeted to IoT malware is significant. Traditional security mechanism may not be feasible 
against malware. Therefore, antivirus could be the effective solution to detect known 
malware. But the antivirus scanning functionality may results the overhead to IoT devices.  
• Lightweight Cryptosystem: Asymmetric key cryptosystem can provide some more 
security features compared to private-key cryptosystem, but the problem is computational 
overhead. In the case of authenticity and data integrity public-key cryptography are mostly 
desirable. Therefore, maintaining complex security protocols and reducing computational 
overhead for the asymmetric key cryptosystem has become a great challenge for IoT [73]. 
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Global Network 
 IoT Service  Service 
   Controller  IoT Service Provider 
 
Local Network 
   IoT Device  IoT Device 
         Device  Coordinator 
  Coordinator  Gateway 
Table 8: IoT Attack Surfaces [74] 
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4.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS WITH ZOLERTIA 
4.1 Zolertia IoT Devices 
     Zolertia [75] is a company located in Barcelona, Spain that provides hardware solutions for 
Internet of Things Applications. Zolertia company produces their own hardwires and firmware but 
also design the hardwires with specific solutions based on their client demands. It allows the 
integration of long-range communication technology between IoT constrained devices [76]. Their 
projects claim to be appreciated for academic and organizational purpose as well as for the 
developers.  
Three Main Zolertia hardware platforms are: 
Z1 Mote: Zolertia's first commercially available platform was Z1 Mote, developed for researchers 
and enthusiasts. It is a general-purpose card and has an ultra-low power MCU with 16 MHz clock 
speed, 8 Kb RAM and 92 Kb Flash. It includes 2.4 GHz Transceiver with data rate of 250 Kbps 
and two on-board digital sensors [77].  
 
Figure 10: Zolertia Z1 Mote [77] 
 
Figure 11: Zolertia Firefly [77] 
Firefly: Firefly is a small card with some essential features. It reveals the basic Zolertia Zoul 
features. It includes powerful CC2538 core by Texas Instruments, an 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 with 
512KB flash, 32KB RAM and 32MHz clock speed [77]. 
RE-Mote: RE-Mote is the latest hardware development platform designed jointly with the 
industrial partners and universities. It includes all Zoul features as like Firefly. It carries battery 
charger, two radios, external storage and available interfaces and connectors for analogue or 
digital sensors [77]. 
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4.2 Tools Utilized 
     All the technological details about the tools and technologies required for this chapter, IoT 
protocols and security mechanisms are thoroughly described in the previous chapters. Hence at 
this section 4.2, a brief description of the technical tools that were used to reach our motive of 
implementing secure communication between IoT devices are presented.  
4.2.1 Operating Systems 
     Contiki: Contiki [78] is an open source operating system for low-powered, memory-
constrained IoT devices that uses wireless sensor networks. Contiki is written in C language and 
provides the appropriate functions for the connectivity between IoT devices [27]. It supports full 
IP network stack IPv6 and IPv4 as well as 6LowPAN stack [77]. Contiki has a simulation 
environment Cooja Network Simulator that allows developers to see their applications is run in 
large-scale network or detail on the experimental hardware devices [78]. Contiki includes libraries 
for the applications like HTTP, UDP, CoAP and MQTT client [77]. 
 
     RIOT: RIOT [79] is an open source, user friendly operating system for IoT. It was designed for 
real-time capabilities, high energy efficiency, multi-threading and to support wide range of low-
power, low memory supportive IoT devices [77]. It provides tools and utilities like hash tables, 
system shell, SHA-256, bloom filters and cryptographic libraries [77] [79]. RIOT supports 
6LowPAN stack, IPv6, UDP, RPL and CoAP [79]. 
 
4.2.2 6LowPAN Border Router 
     In order to implement MQTT system, CETIC-6LBR was used as a Border Router (BR) with a 
broker and Zolertia RE-Mote devices (WSN nodes) as clients running on Local Area Network 
(LAN). A Border Router is used to connect the 6LowPAN devices with the IPv6 network. 
Therefore, it is responsible for managing all traffics between 802.15.4 and IPv6 network. 6LBR 
[80] is an open source Border Router solution based on the Contiki Operating System. It can be 
used for low-cost, open source hardware platforms and Linux host [77]. 6LBR supports different 
network topologies and can be designed with variety of network architectures such as Smart 
Bridge, Router and Transparent Bridge [81]. Some additional features are network 
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autoconfiguration, multicast communication and synchronization of 6LowPAN WSNs with IP 
Network [81]. 6LBR border router architecture is presented in Figure 12. 
 
 
 6LBR Platform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              Wireless Sensor Network 
Figure 12: 6LBR Border Router 
 
CETIC 6LBR in Figure 13 has two 2.4 GHz and SUB-G radio connections, 1 Mini to Standard 
USB cable connection and a RJ-45 cable connection port. It has a reset button which can be used 
to restart the device configuration. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 13: CETIC 6LBR 
6LBR 
Contiki Application 
802.15.4 eth 
IP 
Network 
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4.2.3 Digital Grove Light Sensor 
This Digital Grove Light Sensor module is based on the I2C light-to-digital converter TSL2561 to 
transform light intensity to a digital signal [82]. It is different from analog light sensor. Digital Grove 
Light Sensor has three different detection modes: infrared mode, human visible and full apectrum 
mode [82]. 
.  
Figure 14: Digital Grove Light Sensor with Zolertia RE-Mote 
Some key features of this light sensor are [82]: 
• Detection modes are selectable. 
• Dynamic range is 0.1 - 40,000 LUX. 
• Sensor dimension is 24mm x20mm x9.8mm. 
• Temperature range to operate is -40℃ to 85℃. 
• High resolution 16-Bit digital output at 400 kHz I2C Fast-Mode. 
 
4.2.4 Zolertia RE-Mote as a hardware platform 
     The Zolertia RE-Mote is a hardware development platform that allows the development of IoT 
applications. It includes powerful Texas Instruments CC2538 core ARM Cortex-M3 system on 
chip that works at up to 32 MHz with programmable 512 KB flash and 32 KB RAM [83]. RE-Mote 
has the following features [83]: 
• Two radios (ISM 2.4-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 & Zigbee compliant radio and ISM 863-950-MHz 
ISM/SRD band IEEE 802.15.4 compliant radio) for both long range and indoor 
applications. The maximum communication range is 100 m to 20 km with highly 
configurable parameters like data rate, modulation and transmission power. 
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• It has built-in battery charger, uses rechargeable LiPo batteries, direct connection to solar 
panel and energy harvesting methods. USB cable connection can automatically recharge 
the battery. 
• Ultra-low power consumption down to 150 nA using shutdown mode. 
• External storage with a micro SD to store and retrieve data. 
 
 
Figure 15: Zolertia RE-Mote 
 
• Available connectors and interfaces for analog or digital sensor connection 
simultaneously.  
• It has Real Time clock capabilities to develop applications based on real time information 
such as setting the device as wake up mode in every 10 minutes to send latest data.  
• The RE-Mote devices are supported in Contiki and RIOT open source operative systems. 
 
4.3 Test Implementation and Results 
4.3.1 Printing text message 
      At first, we started our implementation round with printing simple text messages in a Zolertia 
RE-Mote device. For this testing, we used Contiki OS version 3.0 and a Zolertia RE-Mote as a 
hardware device with IPv6 address: 00:12:4B:00:18:E6:9C:62. We used an example program 
from Contiki for the testing  purpose. In Figure 16 we can see the output of the program. 
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Figure 16: Hello message in a Zolertia RE-Mote 
The main function of the testing program is given below: 
 
PROCESS_THREAD(hello_world_process, ev, data) 
{ 
  /* Process starts here*/ 
  PROCESS_BEGIN(); 
 
  static uint16_t num = 0xABCD; 
  static const char *hello = "Hello, again! It is a nice journey."; 
 
  printf("Hello,Tampere University\n"); 
 
  /* will print the defined string*/ 
  printf("%s\n", hello); 
 
  /* Here then  mix numeric values with strings */ 
  printf("This is a value in hex 0x%02X, the same as %u\n", num, num); 
   
  /* End of the process */ 
  PROCESS_END(); 
} 
 
4.3.2 Data reading from a Digital Light Sensor 
       In this section 4.3.2 we used a Digital Grove Light Sensor to measure the light weight of a 
room. In addition, we used Contiki testbed and Zolertia RE-Mote to reach the desired goal. In 
Figure 17, we can see the variation of light value in between 0 to 85 (unsigned integer value as 
defined in program). We used a Contiki example program for this testing. 
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Figure 17: Testing with Digital Grove Light Sensor 
Here is the main function of the Contiki example program for Digital Grove Light Sensor [84]: 
PROCESS_THREAD(remote_tsl256x_process, ev, data) 
{ 
  PROCESS_BEGIN(); 
  static uint16_t light; 
 
  if(TSL256X_REF == TSL2561_SENSOR_REF) { 
    printf("Light sensor test --> TSL2561\n"); 
  } else if(TSL256X_REF == TSL2563_SENSOR_REF) { 
    printf("Light sensor test --> TSL2563\n"); 
  } else { 
    printf("Unknown light sensor reference, aborting\n"); 
    PROCESS_EXIT(); 
  } 
 
SENSORS_ACTIVATE(tsl256x); 
 
TSL256X_REGISTER_INT(light_interrupt_callback); 
 
tsl256x.configure(TSL256X_INT_OVER, 0x15B8); 
 
while(1) { 
    etimer_set(&et, SENSOR_READ_INTERVAL); 
    PROCESS_WAIT_EVENT_UNTIL(etimer_expired(&et)); 
    light = tsl256x.value(TSL256X_VAL_READ); 
    if(light != TSL256X_ERROR) { 
      printf("Light = %u\n", (uint16_t)light); 
    } else { 
      printf("Error, enable the DEBUG flag in the tsl256x driver for info, "); 
      printf("or check if the sensor is properly connected\n"); 
      PROCESS_EXIT(); 
    } 
  } 
  PROCESS_END(); 
} 
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4.3.3 Implementation of UDP Protocol 
 
 
Figure 18: UDP Client 
 
 
Figure 19: UDP Server 
 
To establish the UDP communication we used two hardware RE-Mote device, one device acting 
as a UDP client and another one as a UDP server. We used a device as a border router, global 
and link local IPv6 address of the border router is in Figure 20. To check the device connection 
with the local network we activated the border router. UDP server port 5678 and Client port 8765 
are defined in the example programs of Contiki. In Figure 18 we can see the UDP client is sending 
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the ‘Hello’ message to the UDP server and the server is receiving the same packet data from the 
client in Figure 19. As we know UDP does not recover the lost data, we can see that the UDP 
server missed the first message ‘Hello 1’ but after that it received all packets. Figure 21 is the 
Wireshark capture for UDP client and server communication. 
 
 
Figure 20: Border Router 
 
 
Figure 21: Wireshark capture for UDP protocol 
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4.3.4 Implementation of MQTT Protocol 
      For MQTT protocol implementation we used a CETIC-6LBR border router, three Zolertia RE-
Mote devices and a temperature & humidity sensor. We used the IPv6 address of the border 
router as a MQTT broker. All MQTT clients are connected to the broker. Each MQTT client is 
responsible to publish data on a specific topic to the broker and as well as can subscribe data for 
a specific topic. Broker has the database to store the published topic data. Therefore, if any MQTT 
client subscribe to the broker for a topic it can provide the updated data of that topic to the client. 
MQTT clients can connect to the broker and also can disconnect at any time. In Figure 22 all 
activated MQTT clients are connected to the border router. Type is defined in the list according 
to the MAC address of the device and web or coap is the direct link to the HTTP server or CoAP 
server. Upstream and downstream packet reception rate can be added to the program. Last seen 
value is in seconds which means the time since any packet data received from the client. If 
everything is going well then, the status shows OK. 
 
 
Figure 22: MQTT Clients connected to Border Router 
 
In figure 23 we can see that a MQTT client publishing sensor data to the broker on a topic 
zolertia/evt/status. At first the client attempts to registered as a MQTT client. Then when the 
registration is done, client connected to the MQTT broker. Then it subscribes on a topic 
zolertia/cmd/leds which means that the client needs the updated data for the subscribed topic. 
Finally, MQTT client publishes packet data on a specific topic to the MQTT broker. 
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Figure 23: MQTT Client publishing data 
 
4.3.5 Encrypted message 
 
Figure 24: Message Encryption and Decryption 
For this 4.3.5 we used AES-128 encryption method to encrypt and decrypt normal text messages 
to check the device response. In Figure 24 we can see the generated key first and then the 
ciphertext from the plaintext and finally the decryption of the ciphertext which is the normal given 
plain text in the program. In the below I have added the main function of the program and the 
other two functions test_2() and var_text_test() which are used in the program to get the desired 
output. 
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Main Function 
 
  PROCESS_BEGIN(); 
   
  int result = TC_PASS; 
   
  result = test_2(); 
  if (result == TC_FAIL) { /* terminate test */ 
    TC_ERROR("AES128 test #2 (NIST encryption test) failed.\n"); 
  } 
 
  const char *msg = "ZOLERTIA RE-MOTE"; 
 
  struct tc_aes_key_sched_struct s; 
  (void)tc_aes128_set_encrypt_key(&s, nist_key); 
 
  var_text_test((const uint8_t *) msg, &s); 
 
  PROCESS_END(); 
} 
 
Other functions 
 
 
int test_2(void) 
  { 
    int result = TC_PASS; 
    int i; 
 
    struct tc_aes_key_sched_struct s; 
    uint8_t ciphertext[NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS]; 
    uint8_t plaintext[NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS]; 
 
    TC_PRINT("AES128 Encryption Test\n"); 
 
    (void)tc_aes128_set_encrypt_key(&s, nist_key); 
 
    tc_aes_encrypt(ciphertext, nist_input, &s); 
 
    for (i=0; i<NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS; i++) 
    { 
      printf("%x ", ciphertext[i]); 
    } 
 
    printf("\n\n"); 
 
    (void)tc_aes128_set_decrypt_key(&s, nist_key); 
 
    tc_aes_decrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, &s); 
 
    for (i=0; i<NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS; i++) 
    { 
      printf("%x ", plaintext[i]); 
    } 
 
    printf("\n"); 
 
  
 int var_text_test(const uint8_t *in, TCAesKeySched_t s) 
  { 
    uint8_t ciphertext[NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS]; 
    uint8_t plaintext[NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS]; 
    int j; 
   
 
    (void)tc_aes_encrypt(ciphertext, in, s); 
     
    for (j=0; j<NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS; j++) 
    { 
      printf("%x", ciphertext[j]); 
    } 
 
 
    printf("\n\n"); 
 
    tc_aes_decrypt(plaintext, ciphertext, s); 
 
    for (j=0; j<NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS; j++) 
    { 
      printf("%x", plaintext[j]); 
    } 
 
    printf("\n"); 
 
    for (j=0; j<NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS; j++) 
    { 
      printf("%c", plaintext[j]); 
    } 
     
    return 0; 
  } 
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    result = check_result(2, expected, sizeof(expected), 
ciphertext, 
              sizeof(ciphertext)); 
 
    TC_END_RESULT(result); 
 
    return result; 
  } 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.6 Secure message Transmission 
      Here we used UDP communication between devices to transmit and receive secure 
messages. For this purpose, we used AES cryptographic method where both devices using a pre-
shared key. We used two Zolertia RE-Mote devices as hardware platforms. In Figure 25 we can 
see the UDP client device first exchanging the session key and then establishing a secure 
connection by sending the encrypted response for text messages along with the key after 
receiving the request from the other device. How AES algorithm works is explained in the previous 
chapter in section 3.4. 
 
 
Figure 25: Device sending Encrypted Message 
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       UDP server response is represented in Figure 26. After receiving the encrypted response 
from the client device, the server is decrypting the encrypted ciphertext to the plaintext. After that 
it is sending the request to the client device for the next message. 
 
 
Figure 26: Device Decrypting received message 
 
4.3.7 Message Encryption using ECC 
      Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key encryption method is used to secure the 
transmitted data. Our main goal was to secure the communication between two or more IoT 
devices. To this end, we used ECC in order to establish a symmetric encryption key that would 
be finally used as a session key for encrypting the communication channel between a set of IoT 
devices. For the encryption of the communication channel we used AES-128 message 
encryption– hence all the exchanged messages during a session were encrypted using this 
algorithm. We were able to deploy the complete ECC key generation process in a Zolertia RE-
Mote device to see the performance and how the method works. The output result of the used 
ECC encryption process are presented in Figure 27. How the program is designed is explained 
below: 
For two devices A and B first the ECC program computes two random 256 bits secret keys 
respectively for Secret A and Secret B. The functions ecc_setRandom(secretA) and 
ecc_setRandom(secretB) are used to compute the secret key. Then two Basepoints (X,Y) are 
defined in the program which are used along with the secret key to generate the public and private 
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key pair for each device. Then the devices sharing their keys with each other. After that the 256 
bits shared private key for both devices generated using the key pairs and these keys should be 
same. To reduce the key size from 256 bits to 128 bits Hash function is used in the program to 
make it suitable for the IoT constrained device. Then the ciphertext and hash value for the 
plaintext are generated and the message decryption process added at the last part of the program. 
During the implementation we noticed that it took a bit longer time to generate the shared private 
key. To make the process clearer the main program is added below the Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27: ECC key generation and message encryption 
 
 
#define NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS 16 
#define NUM_OF_FIXED_KEYS 128 
struct kat_table { 
  uint8_t in[NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS]; 
  uint8_t out[NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS]; 
}; 
//These are testvalues taken from the NIST P-256 definition 
//6b17d1f2 e12c4247 f8bce6e5 63a440f2 77037d81 2deb33a0 f4a13945 d898c296 
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uint32_t BasePointx[8] = { 0xd898c296, 0xf4a13945, 0x2deb33a0, 0x77037d81, 0x63a440f2, 
0xf8bce6e5, 0xe12c4247, 0x6b17d1f2}; 
uint32_t BasePointy[8] = { 0x37bf51f5, 0xcbb64068, 0x6b315ece, 0x2bce3357, 0x7c0f9e16, 
0x8ee7eb4a, 0xfe1a7f9b, 0x4fe342e2}; 
uint32_t Sx[8] = { 0x89da97c9, 0xb77cab39, 0x221a8fa0, 0x617519b3, 0x0f271508, 
0x82edd27e, 0xbc8d36e6, 0xde2444be}; 
uint32_t Sy[8] = { 0x3042a256, 0xb6350b24, 0x53cec576, 0x702de80f, 0xd1e66659, 
0xfc01a5aa, 0xf36e5380, 0xc093ae7f}; 
uint32_t Tx[8] = { 0x35e0986b, 0xbb8cf92e, 0x61c89575, 0x39540dc8, 0x5316212e, 
0x62f6b3b2, 0x8da1d44e, 0x55a8b00f}; 
uint32_t Ty[8] = { 0xc8b24316, 0xb656e9d8, 0x598b9e7a, 0xf61a8a52, 0xc4c3dd90, 
0x4835d82a, 0x9c2d6c70, 0x5421c320}; 
 
struct Hash_Msg  
{ 
    uint8_t hashtag[NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS]; 
}; 
struct Encrypt_Msg  
{ 
    uint8_t ciphertext[NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS]; 
    uint8_t plaintext[NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS]; 
}; 
struct Sha_Msg  
{ 
    uint8_t digest[NUM_OF_NIST_KEYS]; 
}; 
struct Generate_ECC_Key 
{ 
 uint32_t sharedK1[8]; 
 uint32_t sharedK2[8]; 
}; 
struct Generate_ECC_Key ecc_function() 
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{  
 struct Generate_ECC_Key ecctest1; 
 uint32_t tempx[8]; 
 uint32_t tempy[8]; 
 uint32_t tempAy2[8]; 
 uint32_t tempBx1[8]; 
 uint32_t tempBy1[8]; 
 uint32_t tempBy2[8];  
 uint32_t secretA[8]; 
 uint32_t secretB[8]; 
 
 /* Compute the secret key randomly */ 
 ecc_setRandom(secretA); 
 printNumber("Secret A", secretA, 8); 
 ecc_setRandom(secretB); 
 printNumber("Secret B", secretB, 8); 
 
 /* Generate Private and Public Key Pair */ 
 ecc_ec_mult(BasePointx, BasePointy, secretA, tempx, tempy); 
 ecc_ec_mult(BasePointx, BasePointy, secretB, tempBx1, tempBy1); 
 
 //public key exchange 
 ecc_ec_mult(tempBx1, tempBy1, secretA, ecctest1.sharedK1, tempAy2); 
 ecc_ec_mult(tempx, tempy, secretB, ecctest1.sharedK2, tempBy2); 
 return (ecctest1); 
}; 
 
struct Encrypt_Msg encrypt_test(const uint8_t *in, TCAesKeySched_t s) 
{ 
    struct Encrypt_Msg encrypt1; 
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    (void)tc_aes_encrypt(encrypt1.ciphertext, in, s); 
    tc_aes_decrypt(encrypt1.plaintext, encrypt1.ciphertext, s); 
    return (encrypt1);    
}; 
struct Sha_Msg sha_function(const uint8_t *msg) 
{ 
 struct tc_sha256_state_struct s; 
 struct Sha_Msg sha12; 
    (void)tc_sha256_init(&s); 
    tc_sha256_update(&s, msg, sizeof(msg)); 
    (void)tc_sha256_final(sha12.digest, &s); 
 
    return (sha12);        
}; 
 
struct Hash_Msg hmac_function(const uint8_t *msg, const uint8_t *key) 
  { 
    struct tc_hmac_state_struct h; 
    struct Hash_Msg Hash1; 
    (void)memset(&h, 0x00, sizeof(h)); 
    (void)tc_hmac_set_key(&h, key, sizeof(key)); 
    (void)tc_hmac_init(&h); 
    (void)tc_hmac_update(&h, msg, sizeof(msg)); 
    (void)tc_hmac_final(Hash1.hashtag, TC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, &h); 
    return (Hash1); 
  } 
 
 
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
PROCESS(final_program, "Final ECC Program"); 
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AUTOSTART_PROCESSES(&final_program); 
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
PROCESS_THREAD(final_program, ev, data) 
{ 
 PROCESS_BEGIN(); 
 srand(5678); 
 char *msg = " HELLO TAMPERE "; 
 struct Generate_ECC_Key ecckey; 
 struct Sha_Msg sha2; 
 struct Sha_Msg sha3; 
 struct Encrypt_Msg encrypt2; 
 struct Hash_Msg hash2; 
 
   struct tc_aes_key_sched_struct s; 
   ecckey = ecc_function(); 
   printf("\n"); 
   printNumber("Shared Private", ecckey.sharedK1, 8); 
 printNumber("Shared Private", ecckey.sharedK2, 8); 
 printf("\n"); 
 sha2 = sha_function((const uint8_t *)ecckey.sharedK1); 
 sha3 = sha_function((const uint8_t *)ecckey.sharedK2); 
 (void)tc_aes128_set_encrypt_key(&s, sha2.digest); 
 show_str("Hashed ECC Key 1", sha2.digest, sizeof(sha2.digest)); 
 show_str("Hashed ECC Key 2", sha3.digest, sizeof(sha3.digest)); 
 printf("\n"); 
  encrypt2 = encrypt_test((const uint8_t *)msg, &s); 
  show_str("Encrypted Value", encrypt2.ciphertext, sizeof(encrypt2.ciphertext)); 
  printf("\n"); 
 hash2 = hmac_function(encrypt2.ciphertext, sha2.digest); 
 show_str("Hashed Value", hash2.hashtag, sizeof(hash2.hashtag)); 
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 unsigned int i; 
 
    TC_PRINT("Decrypted Message = "); 
    for (i = 0; i < (unsigned int) sizeof(encrypt2.plaintext); ++i)  
    { 
        TC_PRINT("%c", encrypt2.plaintext[i]); 
    } 
    TC_PRINT("\n"); 
   PROCESS_END(); 
} 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 5.1 Conclusion and Future Work 
      IoT technologies such as sensor and RFID make our life becomes more comfortable and 
easier. The Importance of security in the IoT sector is dramatically rising along with the rapid 
progression of the underlying industry. The vision of IoT is not only limited to make our lives easier 
but also to ensure safety benefits for the end-users. The presence of the IoT paradigm in the last 
few years has conducted to diverse security or privacy threats and attacks in IoT. In fact, in the 
IoT system model, there are many security issues which can be utilized by security threats to 
make the system weak. To protect IoT from those threats it is essential to completely enforce the 
security and trust management in the IoT world with the beginning of threats characterization for 
each layer of IoT networks as well as making secure the communication protocols. 
      The main target of this thesis has been to express the importance of IoT security and 
challenges to employ security in IoT. In this regard, this research focuses on the existing studies 
and analyzing them to describe the security issues, challenges in IoT and different IoT protocols. 
Several limitations to apply traditional security schemes in IoT are found from the literature study. 
It is found from thesis research that, due to the constrained resources of IoT devices, there are 
several challenges to implement security and threats to IoT which are discussed in section 3.1.  
In addition, some protocol implementations and secure message transmission using AES-128 
encryption standard are added in Chapter 4. IoT protocols IEEE 802.15.4, 6LowPAN, RPL, MQTT 
and CoAP both application layer protocols, functions of each protocol and their security features 
as well as their limitations regarding security are discussed in section 3.2. DTLS security protocol 
which is required by the CoAP protocol as an additional protocol to establish secure 
communication and cryptographic algorithms Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Elliptic-
curve cryptography (ECC) are also described in Chapter 3.  
      MQTT protocol implementation using Contiki OS is completed with a real IoT hardware 
platform Zolertia RE-Mote device. Other tools 6LowPAN border router 6LBR and the temperature 
and humidity sensor are used to deploy the MQTT communication. UDP protocol communication 
and secured UDP communication using AES-128 encryption standard established within this 
work. Along with the AES symmetric encryption method implementations, ECC public key 
algorithm process is discussed in Chapter 4. During the ECC implementation in section 4.3.7 we 
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noticed it takes time to generate the shared private key for devices. Since ECC generates smaller 
keys but provides the same level of cryptographic strength which is suitable for the limited 
processing power and limited memory devices, it is becoming the common security solution for 
IoT.  
      In this work, we could not cover the implementation of CoAP protocol and the DTLS security 
protocol in the Zolertia RE-Mote devices. It was not possible to establish the communication 
between devices using ECC encryption method, only the key generation process included in the 
thesis. In the future, we intend to complete the communication between devices using public key 
encryption standard ECC and to implement CoAP protocol including the DTLS security features. 
5.2 Problems encountered 
      During the implementation phase of IoT protocols, some difficulties were encountered.  CETIC 
6LBR configuration was not properly done as per the given instructions in the Zolertia 
documentary. Some additional sensors like barometer sensor, temperature sensor and gas 
sensor were not working with the specific programs that are available in Contiki. In addition, DTLS 
security protocols could not be examined due to the bugs in the programs. Finally, there were a 
lot of bugs which prevented us from using the latest commit of Contiki and must be fixed. Due to 
the community-driven and open source nature of Contiki it is expected to be fixed as because 
everyone can contribute to it. For the MQTT implementation, a significant amount of time was 
spent to deploy the MQTT in real hardware devices and to connect the devices with the broker. 
After making some changes in 6LBR configurations it was possible to get the result. This problem 
could be solved easily if the 6LBR had complete documentation with the description of all 
supported modes of operations and how it must be configured in which situation.   
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